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 Abstract  Over the past several decades, many states have pursued substantive 
changes to their state school fi nance systems. Some reforms have been stimulated 
by judicial pressure resulting from state constitutional challenges and others have 
been initiated by legislatures. But despite gains in school funding equity and ade-
quacy made over the past few decades, in recent years we have witnessed a substan-
tial retreat from equity and adequacy. This chapter builds on the national school 
funding fairness report annually published by the Education Law Center. We track 
school funding fairness (the relative targeting of funding to districts serving eco-
nomically disadvantaged children) for all states from 1993 to 2012. This chapter 
explores in greater depth the consequences of school funding levels, distributions, 
and changes in specifi c classroom resources provided in schools. We fi nd that states 
and districts applying more effort—spending a greater share of their fi scal capacity 
on schools—generally spend more on schools, and that these higher spending levels 
translate into higher staffi ng levels and lower class sizes as well as more competitive 
teacher wages. 
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 Introduction 
 Over the past  several  decades, many states have pursued substantive changes to their 
state  school fi nance systems . Some reforms have been stimulated by judicial pres-
sure resulting from  state constitutional challenges and others have been initiated by 
legislatures. But despite gains in  school funding equity and adequacy made over the 
past few decades, in recent years we have witnessed a substantial retreat from equity 
and adequacy, and retrenchment among state legislatures, governors, and federal 
offi cials across the political aisle, with many contending that the level and distribu-
tion of school funding are not primary factors in quality of education. 
 This chapter builds on the national school funding fairness report annually pub-
lished by the  Education Law Center , in which we apply regression-based methods 
to national data on all local public school districts to characterize state school 
fi nance systems (Baker et al.  2014 ). Specifi cally, we evaluate whether those systems 
lead to consistent targeting of resources to districts serving higher concentrations of 
children from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. 
 In this chapter we expand our analysis in two directions. First, our past three 
national reports have each been based on the most recent three available years of 
district level data on state and local revenues. In this chapter, we track  school fund-
ing fairness (the relative targeting of funding to districts serving economically dis-
advantaged children) for all states from 1993 to 2012. This time period includes 
substantive changes to state school fi nance systems in several states, whether as a 
function of ongoing litigation or proactive legislative change. Further, this period 
runs through the recent economic downturn, in which several state school fi nance 
systems lost signifi cant ground, both in level of overall funding and in fairness of 
distribution (Baker  2014 ). Thus we are able to evaluate the extent of backsliding and 
the partial rebound that has occurred. 
 Second, this chapter explores in greater depth the consequences of school fund-
ing levels, distributions, and changes in specifi c  classroom resources provided in 
schools. The majority of school spending is dedicated to staffi ng, with the primary 
spending tradeoff being the balance between employee salaries and the numbers of 
employees assigned. Competitive teacher wages and appropriate  class sizes are 
important to the provision of equitable and adequate educational programs and ser-
vices. The third edition of  Is School Funding Fair included additional indicators 
related to (a)  pupil-to-teacher ratios across higher and lower poverty districts and 
(b) the relative competitiveness of teacher wages statewide when compared with 
nonteachers at similar education level and age. In that report, we provided prelimi-
nary evidence that more equitable funding distributions with respect to poverty con-
centrations did indeed translate to more equitable distributions of pupil-to-teacher 
ratios. Further, states with higher funding levels tended to have, on average, more 
competitive teacher wages relative to other professions. 
 In this chapter, we explore both of these additional measures during a 20-year 
time period, and we add measures of class size and variation in teacher wages across 
schools and districts using data from the  National Center for Education Statistics 
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(NCES) Schools and Staffi ng Survey . Specifi cally, we explore whether targeting of 
funding to higher poverty districts translates to reduction of class sizes and the num-
ber of students per teacher in higher poverty settings relative to lower poverty ones. 
We also explore whether targeting of funding to higher poverty settings leads to 
more competitive wages in those settings. A substantial body of research points to 
the need not merely for comparable wages, but substantial added compensation to 
support recruiting and retaining teachers in high-need settings. 
 Conceptions of Equity, Equal Opportunity, and Adequacy 
 Reforms across the nation to state school fi nance systems have been focused on 
simultaneously achieving equal educational opportunity and adequacy. While 
achieving and maintaining educational adequacy requires a school fi nance system 
that consistently and equitably meets a certain level of educational outcomes, it is 
important to maintain  equal educational opportunity in those cases where funding 
falls below adequacy thresholds. That is, whatever the level of outcomes attained 
across a school system, it should be equally attainable regardless of where a child 
lives or attends school or his or her background. 
 Conceptions of school fi nance equity and adequacy have evolved over the years. 
Presently, the central assumption is that state fi nance systems should be designed to 
provide children, regardless of where they live and attend school, with equal oppor-
tunity to achieve some constitutionally adequate level of outcomes (Baker and 
Green  2009a ). Much is embedded in this statement and it is helpful to unpack it, one 
layer at a time. 
 The main concerns of advocates, policy makers, academics, and state courts 
from the 1960s through the 1980s were to (a) reduce the overall variation in per- 
pupil spending across local public school districts; and (b) disrupt the extent to 
which that spending variation was related to differences in taxable property wealth 
across districts. That is, the goal was to achieve more equal dollar inputs—or  nomi-
nal spending equity— coupled with  fi scal neutrality— or reducing the correlation 
between local school resources and local property wealth. While modern goals of 
providing equal opportunity and achieving educational adequacy are more complex 
and loftier than mere  spending equity or  fi scal neutrality , achieving the more basic 
goals remains relevant and still elusive in many states. 
 An alternative to nominal spending equity is to look at the  real resources pro-
vided across children and school districts: the programs and services, staffi ng, mate-
rials, supplies and equipment, and educational facilities provided (Still, the emphasis 
is on equal provision of these inputs) (Baker and Green ( 2009b ). Providing real 
resource equity may, in fact, require that per-pupil spending not be perfectly equal 
if, for example, resources such as similarly qualifi ed teachers come at a higher price 
(competitive wage) in one region than in another.  Real resource parity is more 
meaningful than mere dollar equity. Further, if one knows how the prices of real 
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resources differ, one can better compare the value of the school dollar from one 
location to the next. 
 Modern conceptions of equal educational opportunity and educational adequacy 
shift emphasis away from schooling inputs and onto schooling outcomes—and 
more specifi cally equal opportunity—to achieve some level of educational out-
comes. References to broad outcome standards in the school fi nance context often 
emanate from the seven standards articulated in  Rose v. Council for Better 
Education , 1 a school funding adequacy case in 1989 in Kentucky that scholars con-
sider the turning point in shifting the focus from equity to adequacy in school 
fi nance legal theory (Clune  1994 ). There are two separable but often integrated 
goals here— equal opportunity and  educational adequacy . 
 The fi rst goal is achieved when all students are provided the real resources to 
have equal opportunities to achieve some common level of educational outcomes. 
Because children come to school with varied backgrounds and needs, striving for 
common goals requires moving beyond mere equitable provision of  real resources. 
For example, children with disabilities and children with limited English language 
profi ciency may require specialized resources (personnel), programs, materials, 
supplies, and equipment. Schools and districts serving larger shares of these chil-
dren may require substantively more funding to provide these resources. Further, 
where poverty is highly concentrated, smaller class sizes and other resource- 
intensive interventions may be required to strive for those outcomes achieved by the 
state’s average child. 
 Meanwhile, conceptions of educational adequacy require that policy makers 
determine the desired level of outcome to be achieved. Essentially, adequacy con-
ceptions attach a “level” of outcome expectation to the equal educational opportu-
nity concept. Broad adequacy goals are often framed by judicial interpretation of 
state constitutions. It may well be that the outcomes achieved by the average child 
are deemed suffi cient. But it may also be that the preferences of policy makers or a 
specifi c legal mandate are somewhat higher (or lower) than the outcomes achieved 
by the average child. The current buzz phrase is that schools should ensure that 
children are “college ready” 2 
1  As per the court’s declaration: “An effi cient system of education must have as its goal to provide 
each and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) suffi cient oral and written 
communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civiliza-
tion; (ii) suffi cient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to 
make informed choices; (iii) suffi cient understanding of governmental processes to enable the 
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) suffi cient 
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) suffi cient grounding 
in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) suf-
fi cient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fi elds so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) suffi cient levels of aca-
demic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their coun-
terparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market. Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).  https://casetext.com/#!/case/
rose-v-council-for-better-educ-inc . 
2  See PARCC website at  http://www.parcconline.org . 
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 One fi nal distinction, pertaining to both equal educational opportunity and ade-
quacy goals, is the distinction between striving to achieve equal or adequate out-
comes versus providing the resources that yield equal opportunity for children, 
regardless of their backgrounds or where they live. Achieving  equal outcomes is 
statistically unlikely at best, and of suspect policy relevance, given that perfect 
equality of outcomes requires leveling down (actual outcomes) as much as leveling 
up. A goal of school fi nance policy is to provide the resources to offset pre-existing 
inequalities that otherwise give one child a greater chance than another of achieving 
the desired outcome levels. 
 Money and School Finance Reforms 
 There is an increasing body of evidence that substantive and sustained state school 
fi nance reforms matter for improving both the level and distribution of short-term 
and long-run student outcomes. A few studies have attempted to tackle school 
fi nance reforms broadly, applying multistate analyses over time. Card and Payne 
( 2002 ) found “evidence that equalization of spending levels leads to a narrowing of 
test score outcomes across family background groups” (Card and Payne  2002 , 49). 
Most recently, Jackson et al. evaluated long-term outcomes of children exposed to 
court-ordered school fi nance reforms, fi nding that “a 10 % increase in per-pupil 
spending each year for all 12 years of public school leads to 0.27 more completed 
years of education, 7.25 % higher wages, and a 3.67 percentage-point reduction in 
the annual incidence of adult poverty; effects are much more pronounced for chil-
dren from low-income families” ( 2015 , 1). 
 Numerous other researchers have explored the effects of specifi c state school 
fi nance reforms over time, applying a variety of statistical methods to evaluate how 
changes in the level and targeting of funding affect changes in outcomes achieved 
by students directly affected by those  funding changes. Figlio ( 2004 ) says that the 
infl uence of state school fi nance reforms on student outcomes is perhaps better mea-
sured within states over time, explaining that national studies of the type attempted 
by Card and Payne confront problems of (a) the enormous diversity in the nature of 
state aid reform plans, and (b) the paucity of national level student  performance 
data . 
 Several such studies provide compelling evidence of the potential positive effects 
of  school fi nance reforms . Studies of Michigan school fi nance reforms in the 1990s 
have shown positive effects on student performance in both the previously lowest 
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spending districts 3 and previously lower performing districts. 4 Similarly, a study of 
Kansas school fi nance reforms in the 1990s, which also primarily involved a level-
ing up of low-spending districts, found that a 20 % increase in spending was associ-
ated with a 5 % increase in the likelihood of students going on to postsecondary 
education (Deke  2003 ). 
 Three studies of  Massachusetts school fi nance reforms from the 1990s fi nd simi-
lar results. The fi rst, by Thomas Downes and colleagues, found that the combination 
of funding and accountability reforms “has been successful in raising the achieve-
ment of students in the previously low-spending districts.” ( 2009 , 5) The second 
found that “increases in per-pupil spending led to signifi cant increases in math, 
reading, science, and social studies test scores for 4th- and 8th-grade students.” 5 The 
most recent of the three, published in 2014 in the  Journal of Education Finance, 
found that “changes in the state education aid following the education reform 
resulted in signifi cantly higher student performance” (Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 
 2014 , 297). Such fi ndings have been replicated in other states, including Vermont. 6 
 Indeed, the role of money in improving student outcomes is often contested. 
Baker ( 2012 ) explains the evolution of assertions regarding the unimportance of 
money for improving student outcomes, pointing out that these assertions emanate 
in part from misrepresentations of the work of Coleman and colleagues in the 1960s, 
which found that school factors seemed less associated with student outcome differ-
ences than did family factors. This was not to suggest, however, that school factors 
3  Roy ( 2011 ) published an analysis of the effects of Michigan’s 1990s school fi nance reforms that 
led to a signifi cant leveling up for previously low-spending districts. Roy, whose analyses measure 
both whether the policy resulted in changes in funding and who was affected, found that the pro-
posal “was quite successful in reducing interdistrict spending disparities. There was also a signifi -
cant positive effect on student performance in the lowest-spending districts as measured in state 
tests.” (p. 137). 
4  Papke ( 2005 ), also evaluating Michigan school fi nance reforms from the 1990s, found that 
“increases in spending have nontrivial, statistically signifi cant effects on math test pass rates, and 
the effects are largest for schools with initially poor performance.” (p. 821). 
 Most recently, Hyman ( 2013 ) also found positive effects of Michigan school fi nance reforms in 
the 1990s but raised some concerns regarding the distribution of those effects. Hyman found that 
much of the increase was targeted to schools serving fewer low-income children. But the study did 
fi nd that students exposed to an additional “12 %, more spending per year during grades four 
through seven experienced a 3.9 % point increase in the probability of enrolling in college, and a 
2.5 % point increase in the probability of earning a degree.” (p. 1). 
5  “The magnitudes imply a $1000 increase in per-pupil spending leads to about a third to a half of 
a standard-deviation increase in average test scores. It is noted that the state aid driving the esti-
mates is targeted to under-funded school districts, which may have atypical returns to additional 
expenditures.” (Guryan  2001 , 1). 
6  Downes had conducted earlier studies of Vermont school fi nance reforms in the late 1990s (Act 
60). In a 2004 book chapter, Downes noted, “All of the evidence cited in this paper supports the 
conclusion that Act 60 has dramatically reduced dispersion in education spending and has done 
this by weakening the link between spending and property wealth. Further, the regressions pre-
sented in this paper offer some evidence that student performance has become more equal in the 
post-Act 60 period. And no results support the conclusion that Act 60 has contributed to increased 
dispersion in performance.” ( 2004 , 312). 
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were entirely unimportant, and more recent reanalyses of the Coleman data using 
more advanced statistical techniques than available at the time clarify the relevance 
of schooling resources (Konstantopoulos and Borman  2011 ; Borman and Dowling 
 2010 ). 
 Eric Hanushek ushered in the modern-era  “money doesn’t matter” argument in a 
study in which he tallied studies reporting positive and negative correlations between 
spending measures and student outcome measures, proclaiming as his major fi nd-
ing: “There appears to be no strong or systematic relationship between school 
expenditures and student performance” ( 1986 , 1162). 7 
 Baker ( 2012 ) summarized reanalyses of the studies tallied by Hanushek, apply-
ing quality standards to determine study inclusion, and fi nding that more of the 
higher quality studies yielded positive fi ndings with respect to the relationship 
between schooling resources and student outcomes (Baker  2012 ). While Hanushek’s 
above characterization continues to permeate policy discourse over school fund-
ing—and is often used as evidence that “money doesn’t matter”—it is critically 
important to understand that this statement is merely one of uncertainty about the 
direct correlation between spending measures and outcome measures based on stud-
ies prior to 1986. Neither this statement, nor the crude tally behind it, ever provided 
any basis for assuming with certainty that money doesn’t matter. 
 A separate body of literature challenges the assertion of the positive infl uence 
of state school fi nance reforms in general and  court-ordered reforms in particular. 
Baker and Welner ( 2011 ) explain that much of this literature relies on anecdotal 
characterizations of lagging student outcome growth following court-ordered infu-
sions of new funding. Hanushek ( 2009 ) provide one example of this anecdote-
driven approach in a book chapter that seeks to prove that court-ordered school 
funding reforms in New Jersey, Wyoming, Kentucky, and Massachusetts resulted 
in few or no measurable improvements. However, these conclusions are based on 
little more than a series of descriptive graphs of student achievement on the 
National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) in 1992 and 2007 and an 
undocumented assertion that, during that period, each of the four states infused 
substantial additional funds into public education, focused on low-income and 
minority students, in response to judicial orders. They assume that, in all other 
states that serve as a comparison, similar changes did not occur. Yet they validate 
neither assertion. 
 Baker and Welner ( 2011 ) explain that Hanushek and Lindseth failed to measure 
whether substantive changes had occurred to the level or distribution of school 
7  A few years later, Hanushek paraphrased this conclusion in another widely cited article as 
“Variations in school expenditures are not systematically related to variations in student perfor-
mance” (Hanushek  1989 ). Hanushek describes the collection of studies relating spending and out-
comes as follows: “The studies are almost evenly divided between studies of individual student 
performance and aggregate performance in schools or districts. Ninety-six of the 147 studies mea-
sure output by score on some standardized test. Approximately 40 % are based upon variations in 
performance within single districts while the remainder looks across districts. Three-fi fths look at 
secondary performance (grades 7–12) with the rest concentrating on elementary student perfor-
mance” (Fig. 25). 
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 funding as well as when and for how long. For example,  Kentucky reforms had 
largely faded by the mid- to late 1990s, yet Hanushek and Lindseth measure 
 postreform effects in 2007. Similarly, in  New Jersey , infusions of funding occurred 
from 1998 to 2003 (or, arguably, 2005). But Hanushek and Lindseth’s window 
includes 6 years on the front end where little change occurred. Further, funding was 
infused into approximately 30 specifi c New Jersey districts, but Hanushek and 
Lindseth ( 2009 ) explore overall changes to outcomes among low-income children 
and minorities using NAEP data, where some of the children tested attended the 
districts receiving additional support but many did not. 8 Finally, Hanushek and 
Lindseth concede that Massachusetts did, in fact experience substantive achievement 
gains, but attribute those gains to changes in accountability policies rather than 
funding. 
 In an equally problematic analysis, Neymotin ( 2010 ) set out to show that court- 
ordered infusions of funding in Kansas following  Montoy v. Kansas led to no sub-
stantive improvements in student outcomes. However, Neymotin evaluated changes 
in school funding from 1997 to 2006 even though the key Supreme Court decision 
occurred in January 2005 and impacted funding starting in the 2005–2006 school 
year, the end point of Neymotin’s outcome data (Baker and Welner  2011 ). Finally, 
Greene and Trivitt ( 2008 ) present a study in which they claim to show that court- 
ordered school fi nance reforms led to no substantive improvements in student out-
comes. However, while those authors offer the conclusion that court-ordered 
funding increases had no effect, they test only whether the presence of a court order 
is associated with changes in outcomes; they never once measure whether substan-
tive school fi nance reforms followed the court order (also see Neymotin  2010 ). 
 To summarize, there exists no methodologically competent analyses yielding 
convincing evidence that signifi cant and sustained funding increases provide no 
educational benefi ts, and relatively few do not show decisively positive effects 
(Baker and Welner  2011 ). On balance, it is safe to say that a sizable and growing 
body of rigorous empirical literature validates that state school fi nance reforms can 
have substantive, positive effects on student outcomes, including reductions in out-
come disparities or increases in overall outcome levels (Baker and Welner  2011 ). 
8  Hanushek ( 2006 ) goes so far as to title a concurrently produced volume on the same topic “How 
School Finance Lawsuits Exploit Judges’ Good Intentions and Harm Our Children” [emphasis 
ours]. The premise that additional funding for schools often leveraged toward class size reduction, 
additional course offerings or increased teacher salaries, causes harm to children is, on its face, 
absurd. The book, which implies as much in its title, never once validates that such reforms ever 
cause observable harm. Rather, the title is little more than a manipulative attempt to instill fear of 
pending harm in the mind of the uncritical spectator. The book also includes two examples of a 
type of analysis that occurred with some frequency in the mid-2000s and that also had the intent of 
showing that school funding doesn’t matter. These studies would cherry pick anecdotal informa-
tion on either or both of the following: (a) poorly funded schools that have high outcomes, and (b) 
well-funded schools that have low outcomes (see Evers and Clopto  2006 ; Walberg  2006 ). 
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 Resources That Matter 
 The premise that money matters for improving  school quality is grounded in the 
assumption that having more money provides schools and districts the opportunity 
to improve the qualities and quantities of real resources. The primary resources 
involved in the production of schooling outcomes are human resources—the quan-
tity and quality of teachers, administrators, support, and other staff in schools. 
Quantities of  school staff are refl ected in pupil-to-teacher ratios and average class 
sizes. Reduction of class sizes or reductions of overall pupil-to-staff ratios require 
additional staff, and thus additional money, assuming wages and benefi ts for addi-
tional staff remain constant. Quality of school staff depend in part on the compensa-
tion available to recruit and retain them—specifi cally salaries and benefi ts, in 
addition to working conditions. Notably, working conditions may be refl ected in 
part through measures of workload, like average class sizes, as well as the composi-
tion of the student population. 
 A substantial body of literature has accumulated to validate the conclusion that 
both teachers’ overall and relative wages affect the quality of those who choose to 
enter the teaching profession, and whether they stay once they get in. For example, 
Murnane and Olsen ( 1989 ) found that salaries affect the decision to enter teaching 
and the duration of the teaching career, while Figlio ( 1997 ,  2002 ) and Ferguson 
( 1991 ) concluded that higher salaries are associated with more qualifi ed teachers. 
Loeb and Page ( 2000 ) tackled the specifi c issues of relative pay noted above. They 
showed that:
 Once we adjust for labor market factors, we estimate that raising teacher wages by 10 % 
reduces high school dropout rates by 3–4 %. Our fi ndings suggest that previous studies have 
failed to produce robust estimates because they lack adequate controls for non-wage aspects 
of teaching and market differences in alternative occupational opportunities. 
 In short, while salaries are not the only factor involved, they do affect the quality 
of the teaching workforce, which in turn affects student outcomes. 
 Research on the fl ip side of this issue—evaluating spending constraints or reduc-
tions—reveals the potential harm to teaching quality that fl ows from leveling down 
or reducing spending. For example, Figlio and Rueben ( 2001 ) note that, “Using data 
from the National Center for Education Statistics we fi nd that tax limits systemati-
cally reduce the average quality of education majors, as well as new public school 
teachers in states that have passed these limits.” 
 Salaries also play a potentially important role in improving the  equity of student 
outcomes. While several studies show that higher salaries relative to labor market 
norms can draw higher quality candidates into teaching, the evidence also indicates 
that relative teacher salaries across schools and districts may infl uence the distribu-
tion of teaching quality. For example, Ondrich et al. ( 2008 ) “fi nd that teachers in 
districts with higher salaries relative to non-teaching salaries in the same county are 
less likely to leave teaching and that a teacher is less likely to change districts when 
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he or she teaches in a district near the top of the teacher salary distribution in that 
county.” 
 Others have argued that the dominant structure of  teacher compensation , which 
ties salary growth to years of experience and degrees obtained, is problematic 
because of weak correlations with student achievement gains, creating ineffi cien-
cies that negate the relationship between  school spending and quality (Hanushek 
 2011 ). Existing funds, they argue, instead could be used to compensate teachers 
according to (measures of) their effectiveness while dismissing high-cost “ineffec-
tive” teachers and replacing them with better ones, thus achieving better outcomes 
with the same or less money (Hanushek  2009 ). 
 This argument depends on four large assumptions. First, adopting a pay-for- 
performance model, rather than a step-and-lane salary model, would dramatically 
improve performance at the same or less expense. Second, shedding the “bottom 
5 % of teachers” according to statistical estimates of their “effectiveness” can lead 
to dramatic improvements at equal or lower expense. Third, it assumes there are 
suffi ciently accurate measures of teaching effectiveness across settings and chil-
dren. Finally, this argument ignores the initial sorting of teachers into schools where 
more marketable teachers head for more desirable settings. 
 Existing studies of  pay-for-performance compensation models fail to provide 
empirical support for this argument—either that these alternatives can substantially 
boost outcomes, or that they can do so at equal or lower total salary expense 
(Springer et al.  2011 ). Simulations purporting to validate the long-run benefi ts of 
deselecting “bad” teachers depend on the average pool of replacements lining up to 
take those jobs being substantively better than those who were let go (average 
replacing “bad”). Simulations promoting the benefi ts of “bad teacher” deselection 
assume this to be true, without empirical basis, and without consideration for poten-
tial labor market consequences of the deselection policy itself (Baker et al.  2013a ). 
Finally, existing measures of teacher “effectiveness” fall well short of these demands 
(Ibid.). 
 Most importantly, arguments about the structure of teacher compensation miss 
the bigger point—the average level of compensation matters with respect to the 
average quality of the teacher labor force. To whatever degree teacher pay matters 
in attracting good people into the profession and keeping them around, it’s less 
about how they are paid than how much. Furthermore, the average salaries of the 
teaching profession, with respect to other labor market opportunities, can substan-
tively affect the quality of entrants to the teaching profession, applicants to prepara-
tion programs, and student outcomes. Diminishing resources for schools can 
constrain salaries and reduce the quality of the labor supply. Further, salary differ-
entials between schools and districts might help to recruit or retain teachers in high- 
need settings. So, too, does investment in improved working conditions, from 
infrastructure to smaller class sizes and total student loads. In other words, resources 
for teacher quality matter. 
 Ample research indicates that children in smaller classes achieve better out-
comes, both academic and otherwise, and that class-size reduction can be an effec-
tive strategy for closing racial or socioeconomic achievement gaps (U.S. Department 
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of Education et al.  2003 ). While it’s certainly plausible that other uses of the same 
money might be equally or even more effective, there is little evidence to support 
this. For example, while we are quite confi dent that higher teacher salaries may lead 
to increases in the quality of applicants to the teaching profession and increases in 
student outcomes, we do not know whether the same money spent toward salary 
increases would achieve better or worse outcomes if it were spent toward class size 
reduction. Some have raised concerns that large-scale class-size reductions can lead 
to unintended labor market consequences that offset some of the gains attributable 
to class-size reduction (such as the inability to recruit enough fully qualifi ed teach-
ers). For example, studies of  California ’s statewide class-size reduction initiative 
suggest that as districts across the socioeconomic spectrum reduced class sizes, 
fewer high-quality teachers were available in high-poverty settings (Jepsen and 
Rivkin  2002 ). 9 
 While it would be useful to have more precise cost-benefi t analyses regarding the 
tradeoffs between applying funding to class-size reduction versus increased com-
pensation (Ehrenberg et al.  2001 ), the preponderance of existing evidence suggests 
that the additional resources expended on class-size reductions do produce positive 
effects. Both reductions to class sizes and improvements to competitive wages can 
yield improved outcomes, but the gains in effi ciency of choosing one strategy over 
the other are unclear, and local public school districts rarely have complete fl exibil-
ity to make tradeoffs because class-size reduction may be constrained by available 
classrooms (Baker and Welner  2012 ). Smaller class sizes and reduced total student 
loads are a relevant working condition simultaneously infl uencing  teacher recruit-
ment and  retention (Loeb et al.  2005 ; Isenberg  2010 ). That is, providing smaller 
classes may partly offset the need for higher wages for recruiting or retaining teach-
ers. High-poverty schools require both strategies rather than an either-or proposition 
when it comes to smaller classes and competitive wages. 
 As discussed above, achieving equal educational opportunity requires leveraging 
additional real resources—lower class sizes and more intensive support services—
in high-need settings. Merely achieving equal-quality real resources, including 
equally qualifi ed teachers, likely requires higher competitive wages, not merely 
equal pay in a given labor market. As such, higher-need settings may require sub-
stantially greater fi nancial inputs than lower-need settings. Lacking suffi cient fi nan-
cial inputs to do both, districts must choose one or the other. In some cases, higher 
need districts may lack suffi cient resources to reduce class sizes or provide more 
intensive support. 
9  “The results show that, all else equal, smaller classes raise third-grade mathematics and reading 
achievement, particularly for lower-income students. However, the expansion of the teaching force 
required to staff the additional classrooms appears to have led to a deterioration in average teacher 
quality in schools serving a predominantly Black student body. This deterioration partially or, in 
some cases, fully offset the benefi ts of smaller classes, demonstrating the importance of consider-
ing all implications of any policy change” (p. 1). 
 For further discussion of the complexities of evaluating class size reduction in a dynamic policy 
context, see Sims  2008 ,  2009 ; Chingos  2010 . 
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 In this chapter, we explore the relationship between fi nancial inputs and these 
tradeoffs, both within and across states, and over time. Specifi cally, we address the 
following questions:
•  What patterns in national and state funding equity and adequacy do we see over 
the last two decades? 
•  What patterns do we fi nd in access to important school resources, namely wage 
competitiveness and staffi ng ratios, over the same time period? 
•  What is the relationship between the adequacy and equity of school funding and 
access to real resources (teacher wages, staffi ng ratios, and class sizes)? 
 Measuring Fiscal Input as Well as Real Resource Equity 
and Adequacy 
 In this section, we draw on several national data sources to develop  indicators of (a) 
 school funding levels and distributions, (b)  staffi ng levels and distributions and (c) 
relative  wage levels and distributions (see Appendix (Table  4A.1 ) for full list of data 
sources, years, and measures). Ultimately, our goal is to examine the levels and 
distributions of fi scal input, staffi ng, and wages and discern their relationship. Our 
following analyses use national data sources over time to draw the various connec-
tions displayed in Fig.  4.1 . First, the amount of effort a state puts forth, in addition 
to wealth and income, infl uences the level of resources made available to schools. 
 Revenues available to schools translate to  expenditures , and those expenditures may 
be leveraged to support more competitive wages, hiring and retaining more staff, or 
both. While we do not in this chapter include measures that connect inputs to stu-
dent outcomes, we do expect staffi ng quantities and qualities to substantively 
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 Fig. 4.1  Conceptual map of fi scal inputs & real resources 
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infl uence those outcomes. We also document the relationships between fi nancial 
resources and the real resources purchased with those fi nancial resources. We 
explore these linkages in terms of state average levels of resources and within- state 
distributions of those resources with respect to concentrations of child poverty 
across districts.
 These relationships, while relatively straightforward, have not been systematically 
documented across all states over time in recent years. 10 Specifi cally, there is little 
documentation of the relationship across states between the level of commitment 
made by states to their public schooling systems and the average competitiveness of 
teacher wages, and little documentation of the extent to which differences in and 
changes in spending levels translate to changes in staffi ng ratios and class sizes. 11 
 Evaluating Funding Levels and Fairness 
 We begin with our model for estimating levels and variation in school districts’ state 
and local revenue. Our objectives are twofold: fi rst, to compare across states the 
amount a school district would be expected to receive in state and local revenue (and 
current operating expenditure) if the district was of a given enrollment size (econo-
mies of scale) and population density, faced national average labor costs, and served 
a population with relatively average child poverty levels; second, to evaluate within 
states the amount that a school district would be expected to receive in state and 
local revenue (and current operating expenditure) at varied levels of child poverty, 
holding constant labor costs, district enrollment size, and population density. 
 The goal here is to make more reasonable comparisons of revenue and expendi-
ture levels across local public school districts from one state and to another. So 
adjustments are made accordingly in our models. Average spending per pupil might 
be higher in states with higher labor costs. To compare the purchasing power of that 
spending, we adjust for those cost differences. Average spending per pupil might 
also be higher in states where more children attend school in population-sparse, 
small, rural districts. Thus, we compare spending for districts of otherwise similar 
size and population density across states—a “what if” analysis assuming a district 
size of 2000 or more pupils with average population density. Similarly, unifi ed K-12 
10  For an earlier analysis that parallel school funding disparities and real resource disparities, see 
Corcoran et al.  2004 . 
11  In the absence of clear documentation of these rather obvious connections between fi scal con-
straints, wages, and class sizes, a body of literature has emerged that suggests that no such linkage 
exists, that local public school districts of all types possess more than suffi cient resources to 
achieve competitive, restructured compensation systems, or entirely different service delivery 
approaches altogether with no consequences resulting from resource reallocation. During the eco-
nomic downturn, much of that non-peer-reviewed, think-tank-sponsored literature found its way to 
a special section on the U.S. Department of Education website dedicated to improving educational 
productivity. Baker and Welner ( 2012 ) provide a substantive critique of the reports posted on the 
website. 
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districts might have different average spending than K-8 or high school districts; 
thus we base our comparisons on unifi ed K-12 districts. Finally, we compare reve-
nue and spending predictions for districts of similar  child poverty rates , as child 
poverty infl uences the costs of achieving common outcome goals (Duncombe and 
Yinger  2005 ). 
 For both objectives, we use a 20-year (1993–2012) set of local public school 
district data to which we fi t the following model:
 
Funding per Pupil Regional Competitive Wages District Size
  
 f ,
                   Population Density Grade Range Served
   
, ,
        State Census Child Poverty Rate)  
To account for variation in labor costs, we use the NCES Education Comparable 
Wage Index, updated through 2012 by the author of the original index (Extending 
the NCES CWI 2013). We impute additional years as necessary (see  Appendix ). We 
account for district size with a series of dummy variables indicating that a district 
has (a) under 100 pupils, (b) 101–300 pupils, (c) 301–600 pupils, (d) 601–1200 
pupils, (e) 1201–1500 pupils, and (f) 1501–2000 pupils, where the baseline com-
parison group are districts with over 2000 pupils, a common reference point for 
scale effi ciency. The district size factor is interacted with county-level population 
density to further correct for cost differences associated with small, sparse, rural 
districts, separating them from segregated enclaves in population-dense metropoli-
tan areas. Finally, we interact state dummy indicators with district level child pov-
erty rate to estimate the within-state, cross-district distribution of funding with 
respect to child poverty. The regression model is weighted by district enrollment 
size. 
 We then use this model to generate predicted values of the funding measure—
total state and local revenues per pupil and current operating spending per pupil—at 
varied levels of child poverty for each state at national average labor costs, average 
population density, and effi cient size. To compare levels of funding across states, we 
compare predicted revenue and spending at 10 % census poverty, holding other fac-
tors constant. To compare distributions, we construct what we call a “ fairness ratio .” 
It is the ratio of the predicted funding level for a high poverty district (30 % census 
poverty, equivalent to about 60–80 % qualifi ed for the National School Lunch 
Program), relative to that of a low poverty (0 % census poverty) district. A fairness 
ratio above 1 indicates that the state provides a greater level of resources to high 
poverty districts than low poverty districts, while a ratio below 1 indicates that high- 
poverty districts have fewer resources.
 
Fairness Ratio
Predicted Funding at Poverty
Predicted Funding
 30%
at Poverty0%   
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 Evaluating Resource Levels and Fairness 
 The next step is to estimate levels of real resources in otherwise comparable settings 
across states and to estimate variations in real resources with respect to child 
poverty. 
 Estimating Staffi ng Levels and Distributions  Our approach to modeling staffi ng 
levels follows the one we used to model funding levels. We use annual data from 
1993 to 2012 and apply the same model as above, except putting numbers of teach-
ers per 100 pupils on the left-hand side. Again, the premises are: overall staffi ng 
ratios might be higher on average (better) in states with more children in small, 
low- population-density districts; staffi ng ratios (given spending levels) might be 
lower (worse) in states facing higher labor costs; and staffi ng ratios should vary with 
respect to children’s educational needs, as proxied by district poverty measures.
 
Teachers per Pupils Regional Competitive Wages District Siz100  f , e
Population Density Grade Range Served




verty Rate)  
 We then use this model to (a) generate predicted values of teachers per 100 pupils 
at given levels of poverty, within each state and (b) generate a staffi ng fairness ratio 
like our funding fairness ratio. 
 Evaluating the Average Competitiveness of Teacher Wages  As discussed above, 
one way in which teacher wages matter is that the average relative wage of teachers 
versus other professions in a given labor market may infl uence the quality of those 
entering and staying within the teaching workforce. Here, we use the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) annual data from 2000 to 2012 to 
estimate, for each state, the ratio of the expected income from wages for an elemen-
tary or secondary school teacher to the expected income from wages for a non-
teacher at the same age and degree level. 
 Of primary interest here are the differences in  competitive wage ratios across 
states, and ultimately, whether states that allocate more resources to education gener-
ally are able to achieve more competitive teacher wages. Here, we compare  annual 
wages of teachers to nonteachers, but we also note that variation across states remains 
similar with a comparison of weekly or monthly wages, although teacher wages do 
become more comparable to nonteacher wages. Recall that literature on teacher wages 
and teacher quality suggests that the more competitive the teacher wage (relative to 
other career options), the higher the expected quality of entrants to the profession. 
 To generate our competitive wage ratios, we begin with a regression model fi t to 
our 13-year set of ACS data, in which we estimate the relationship between “income 
from wages” as the dependent variable, a series of state indicators, and an indicator 
that the individual is a teacher (occupation) in elementary or secondary education 
(industry). We include an indicator of the teacher’s age and education level, and we 
include measures of hours worked per week and weeks worked per year but do not 
equate our predicted wages by holding constant these latter two factors in the analy-
ses. We estimate the following model: 
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 We use this model to generate predicted values for teacher and nonteacher wages 
at specifi c age points, for individuals with a bachelor’s degree, and then take the 
ratio of teacher to nonteacher wages. Of particular interest are (a) the differences in 
the teacher/nonteacher wage ratio across states and (b) the changes over time within 
states in the teacher/nonteacher wage ratio. That is, are teacher wages more com-
petitive in some states than others? And have teachers generally gained or lost 
ground? Are these differences in wage competitiveness and gains or losses related 
back to state funding levels? 
 Estimating Sensitivity of Resources to Funding Across Districts 
 For these last two analyses, we link our data on district-level fi nances with teacher- 
level data from the NCES Schools and Staffi ng Survey (SASS), which includes over 
40,000 public school teachers, surveyed in waves on approximately 4-year cycles. 
We use data from the 1993–1994, 1999–2000, 2003–2004, 2007–2008, and 2011–
2012 cycles. 
 Because personnel costs vary across labor markets within states, it is important 
when evaluating either teacher quantity measures or teacher wages to make direct 
comparisons only among districts facing similar  personnel costs . Further, because 
livable wages similarly vary across labor markets, but income thresholds for deter-
mining whether families are in poverty do not, it also makes sense to compare pov-
erty rates only across local public school districts sharing a labor market (Baker 
et al.  2013b ). A convenient solution is to re-express per-pupil spending measures 
and child poverty rates for each school district in the nation relative to (as a ratio to) 
the average per-pupil spending and child poverty rates for all districts sharing that 
same labor market. 
 We use a similar strategy for evaluating variations in both class sizes and com-
petitive teacher wages, with the latter comparisons requiring a preliminary step of 
determining the wage for teachers of comparable qualifi cations and contractual 
obligations. This analysis is different from the previous analyses because we are 
working with samples of teachers and schools where total sample sizes and the 
distribution of sampled teachers for many states are insuffi cient for characterizing 
cross-district equity. As a result, we ask whether nationally, across nonrural labor 
markets, there exists the expected relationship between the relative funding  available 
to local public school districts, and the class sizes and wages of teachers in those 
school districts. That is, do schools in districts with better funding tend to have 
smaller class sizes, more competitive wages, or both? 
 Class Sizes  To  estimate the sensitivity of class size variation to spending variation 
across schools within labor markets, we estimate separate models of departmental-
  Income from Wages State Place of Work k Teacher Age Educati f , , ,12 on Level
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ized and self-contained class sizes. We estimate class sizes as a function of (a) rela-
tive spending, (b) relative poverty, and (c) grade level taught.
 
Class Size Relative Spending Relative Poverty Grade Level  f , ,   
 Teacher Wages  While the  previous wage indicator compared teacher salaries to 
nonteachers, this dataset allows us to compare wages among similar teachers within 
labor markets, but in different school districts. The relative  competitiveness of 
teacher salaries is then examined in the context of the  relative poverty and  relative 
funding levels of school districts . This analysis offers further evidence as to whether 
districts can leverage funding resources to provide more competitive wages to 
teachers in other, less resourced districts. In other words, does the distribution of 
funding affect districts’ ability to offer competitive wages, and therefore infl uence 
the distribution of quality teachers across districts? 
 We begin by estimating, within each labor market in each state, the relative wage 
of teachers with a specifi c set of credentials. We focus on full-time classroom teach-
ers, estimating their salaries (base pay from school year teaching) as a function of 
(a) experience and (b) degree level within (c) labor market (as defi ned in the 
Education Comparable Wage Index, aligned with metropolitan and micropolitan 
statistical areas). We exclude teachers outside of metropolitan and micropolitan 
areas because of small sample sizes within rural labor markets. We estimate sepa-
rate models for each SASS wave.
 
Salary experience degree labor market  f , ,   
 Next, we generate the predicted salary for each teacher in each labor market, 
identifying the average wage for a teacher at given experience and degree level 
across all schools in each labor market. We then take the ratio of actual salary to 
predicted salary, which indicates for all teachers in the sample whether their salary 
is higher or lower than expected. Aggregated to the school or district level, we have 
a measure of the relative competitiveness of teacher wages in each school or district 
compared to other schools or districts sharing the same labor market. 
 The next step is to estimate the sensitivity of these wage variations to spending 
variations across districts sharing the same labor market. We do this with the 
teacher-level data, linked to a measure of the relative spending of their school dis-
trict in its labor market, and the relative poverty rate of the school district in its labor 
market. We take the district’s current operating spending per pupil as a ratio to the 
average of all other districts in the labor market and do the same with district pov-
erty rate. We estimate together the relationship between relative spending and 
 poverty and the relative competitiveness of teacher’s salaries. We include additional 
dummy variables for grade level taught, again including only nonrural full-time 
teachers :
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Salary Competitiveness Relative Spending Relative Poverty f  , ,
           Grade Level Taught)   
 Findings 
 We begin by reviewing longitudinal trends in funding levels and funding fairness. 
We also validate the extent to which state school funding levels are associated with 
differences in  fi scal effort —or the share of gross state product allocated to schools. 
Next, we summarize changes to the  distribution of funding across school districts 
within states, specifi cally evaluating the funding fairness profi les of states and how 
those profi les have changed over the past 20 years. We then proceed to explore aver-
age competitive wage levels across states from 2000 to 2012, and pupil-to-teacher 
ratios across states over the full 20-year period. 
 We subsequently explore the connections between measures of the level and 
distribution of fi nancial inputs to schooling, and the level and distribution of  staffi ng 
quantities and  staffi ng qualities . Specifi cally, we evaluate whether state spending 
levels are associated with the state average competitiveness of teacher wages and 
state average staffi ng ratios (pupil-to-teacher ratios). Then we explore whether 
within-state distributions of fi nancial inputs to schooling are associated with within- 
state distributions of staffi ng ratios, class sizes, and competitive wages. 
 Adequacy and Equity of Fiscal Inputs  Figure  4.2 presents  the  national averages of 
current spending per pupil and state and local revenues per pupil, adjusted for 
 Fig. 4.2  Input price adjusted revenue and spending 
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changes in labor costs by dividing each district’s revenue or spending fi gure by the 
comparable wage index for that district. Both revenues and spending are included to 
illustrate how the two largely move together over time, as one would expect. The 
Education Comparable Wage Index adjusts for both regional variation in labor costs 
(input prices) and infl ationary change in labor costs. Figure  4.2 shows that on aver-
age using district level data weighted by student enrollments, state and local 
 revenues and per pupil spending are up approximately 4.5–5.5 % over the period, 
reaching a high around 2008 and returning to levels comparable to 2000 by 2012. 
 Figure  4.3 summarizes the trends in predicted state and local revenue levels for 
all states, organized by regions. These are combined state and local revenues per 
pupil, predicted for a district with 10 % child poverty, of 2000 or more pupils at 
constant labor costs (though not fully corrected for infl ation). Of particular interest 
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are the trends, divergences, and convergences among regionally contiguous states. 
A notable feature of these fi gures is the sharp shift in growth trajectories that occurs 
in most states around 2009 as a function of the recession. New Jersey, for example, 
experienced a particularly strong downturn.  Delaware is the only state in this mix to 
show no recovery as of yet. Related work has shown that these downturns were 
largely a function of sharp reductions in state aid, buffered in some cases by 
increases to local property taxes. But those shifts in responsibility from state fund-
ing onto local property tax have potential equity consequences. Average revenue 
may have rebounded with offsetting property tax increase, but inequity is likely to 
have increased as a result.
 Figure  4.4 illustrates the relationship in 2012 between the percent of  gross state 
product expended on K-12 schools and the average level of state and local revenue. 
In short, higher effort states do have higher funding levels. Certainly, some rela-
tively  low fi scal capacity states like Mississippi apply average effort and still end up 
with low funding, while  high fi scal capacity states like Wyoming or Connecticut are 
able to apply much lower effort and yield far greater resources. But effort matters 
above and beyond wealth and income. While some might assume that effort crept 
upward as fi scal capacity declined during the recession, this assumption is generally 
wrong. Political proclivity for cutting taxes has led, on average, to reductions in 
funding effort. Forty-one states reduced effort from 2007 to 2012. Further, 5-year 
changes in effort are strongly associated with 5-year changes in revenue levels, as 
B. Baker et al.
117
might be expected (correlation = .7 excluding Alaska). States that reduced effort 
generally reduced school revenues proportionately. 
 Current Expenditure “Fairness” (Spending Equity)  So what then have been the 
consequences of the  economic  downturn for school spending fairness across states? 
That is, how have higher poverty districts been differentially affected when com-
pared with lower poverty ones? Table  4.1 summarizes numbers of states where 
funding fairness improved (or not) over specifi c time periods over the past 20 years. 
Again, a funding fairness ratio of .95 means that a district with 30 % of children in 
poverty 12 has only 95 % of the funding of a district with 0 % children in poverty. A 
fairness ratio of 1.05 indicates that a district with 30 % poverty has 5 % greater 
funding than a district with 0 % poverty.
 From 1993 to 2007 in particular, 40 different states experienced increased fund-
ing levels in higher poverty districts relative to lower poverty ones (only 33 sus-
tained the pattern over the entire period from 1993 to 2012). But in the 5 years that 



























State & Local Revenues as % of GDP-State
 Fig. 4.4  Relationship between effort and revenue (Note: See Appendix (Table  4A.2 ) for full infor-
mation by state) 
 Table 4.1  Numbers of states where funding fairness ratio has improved 
 Initial fairness ratio among improved states 
 Period  # States that improved fairness  <.95  .95–1.05  >1.05 
 1993–2012  33  4  9  20 
 2002–2012  23  3  3  17 
 2007–2012  21  2  4  15 
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followed, 30 states reduced funding fairness, with some of the greatest reductions 
coming in states that had previously experienced the greatest improvements, includ-
ing New Jersey. 
 Table  4.2 summarizes the state-by-state current expenditure fairness ratios and 
changes over time. As noted in Table  4.1 , most states did improve their fairness 
ratios over the entire period, but many reduced fairness over the past 5 years. 
Massachusetts improved fairness at the outset of the period, as did New Jersey, but 
both states taper off in recent years. Other states like Pennsylvania started the period 
with relatively fl at distributions (similar funding in higher and lower poverty dis-
tricts) and then slid into more regressive distributions over time.
 Notably, these fi ndings present a more positive light on funding progressiveness 
than those in the report  Is School Funding Fair, because these fi gures are based on 
current operating spending per pupil, which includes the expenditure of federal 
funds. Those federal funds tend to lift (by around 5 %) the levels of funding in the 
highest poverty districts, thus improving the funding fairness index . 
 Resource Models 
 Relative Annual Wage of Teachers  Table  4.3 summarizes changes to the state aver-
age competitiveness of teacher  wages  over the past 12 years, and then for the most 
recent 5 years.  Wage competitiveness is expressed as a ratio of teacher wages to 
nonteacher wages. A ratio less than 1 means teachers earn less than comparable 
nonteachers. It’s important to understand in this case that there are two moving 
parts—teacher wages and nonteacher wages. Teacher wages can become more com-
petitive if they remain relatively constant but wages of others (at the same age and 
education level) decline. Teacher wages can become less competitive even if they 
appear to grow but do so more slowly than wages in other sectors. Put simply, it’s 
all relative, but it is the relative wage that matters. From 2000 to 2012, teacher 
wages in every state became less competitive, based on our model, a fi nding that is 
consistent with similar work by Mishel et al. ( 2011 ). It would appear that over the 
last 5 years, only in Iowa did teacher wages become marginally more competitive. 
Over the 12-year period, the state average (unweighted) reduction in wage competi-
tiveness was 12 %. Over the period from 2007 to 2012, the state average reduction 
in wage competitiveness was 8 %.
 But, as can be seen in Table  4.4 , these estimates tend to jump around, especially 
in low population states like Alaska. States with persistently noncompetitive teacher 
wages include Colorado and Arizona. Teacher wages have tended over time to be 
more competitive in rural states (where nonteacher wages aren’t as high), including 
Montana and Wyoming. Average teacher wages in New York and Rhode Island have 
also tended to be more competitive, though data are inconsistent across years .
 Teachers per 100 Pupils  Table  4.5 summarizes changes to the numbers of teachers 
per 100 pupils over time. Over the  entire  20-year period, nearly all states increased 
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 Table 4.2  Spending fairness indices for select years 
 Fairness ratio current operating 
expenditures per pupil  Change over time 









 Alabama  1.02  1.06  1.04  1.08  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.04 
 Alaska  2.14  2.44  2.30  1.87  0.17  −0.27  −0.58  −0.44 
 Arizona  1.20  1.18  1.33  1.05  0.13  −0.15  −0.13  −0.27 
 Arkansas  1.13  1.11  1.19  1.23  0.06  0.09  0.11  0.03 
 California  1.17  1.12  1.32  1.20  0.14  0.03  0.08  −0.12 
 Colorado  1.09  1.05  1.15  1.16  0.06  0.07  0.11  0.01 
 Connecticut  1.07  1.30  1.21  1.07  0.15  0.00  −0.23  −0.14 
 Delaware  1.04  1.19  1.64  1.23  0.60  0.19  0.04  −0.41 
 Dist. of Columbia  1.02  1.06  1.04  1.08  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.04 
 Florida  1.33  1.28  1.37  1.19  0.04  −0.14  −0.09  −0.18 
 Georgia  1.22  1.29  1.23  1.20  0.02  −0.01  −0.08  −0.03 
 Hawaii  1.02  1.06  1.04  1.08  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.04 
 Idaho  1.25  1.26  1.16  1.18  −0.09  −0.07  −0.08  0.02 
 Illinois  1.08  0.96  1.07  1.05  −0.01  −0.03  0.08  −0.02 
 Indiana  1.26  1.53  1.62  1.45  0.36  0.19  −0.08  −0.17 
 Iowa  1.19  1.33  1.32  1.20  0.13  0.01  −0.13  −0.12 
 Kansas  1.15  1.33  1.34  1.22  0.19  0.07  −0.11  −0.11 
 Kentucky  1.17  1.17  1.26  1.22  0.09  0.05  0.05  −0.04 
 Louisiana  1.03  1.00  1.08  1.33  0.05  0.30  0.32  0.25 
 Maine  1.12  1.15  1.11  0.99  −0.01  −0.13  −0.16  −0.12 
 Maryland  0.89  1.17  1.12  1.14  0.23  0.24  −0.04  0.02 
 Massachusetts  0.95  1.37  1.39  1.25  0.44  0.30  −0.12  −0.14 
 Michigan  1.04  1.21  1.23  1.20  0.19  0.16  −0.01  −0.02 
 Minnesota  1.39  1.82  1.71  1.60  0.32  0.21  −0.22  −0.11 
 Mississippi  1.19  1.26  1.22  1.30  0.03  0.11  0.04  0.08 
 Missouri  1.25  1.17  1.10  1.05  −0.15  −0.20  −0.11  −0.05 
 Montana  1.18  1.30  1.54  1.18  0.36  0.00  −0.11  −0.36 
 Nebraska  1.14  1.09  1.35  1.36  0.21  0.22  0.27  0.01 
 Nevada  0.61  0.60  0.61  0.57  0.01  −0.03  −0.02  −0.04 
 New Hampshire  0.80  0.95  0.85  1.07  0.05  0.27  0.12  0.22 
 New Jersey  1.05  1.42  1.51  1.26  0.46  0.21  −0.16  −0.25 
 New Mexico  1.11  1.23  1.27  1.29  0.16  0.17  0.06  0.01 
 New York  0.79  0.91  0.96  0.99  0.17  0.20  0.08  0.02 
 North Carolina  1.09  1.13  1.26  1.25  0.17  0.17  0.12  0.00 
 North Dakota  1.34  1.33  1.40  1.43  0.06  0.09  0.10  0.03 
 Ohio  1.19  1.29  1.25  1.16  0.05  −0.03  −0.12  −0.08 
 Oklahoma  1.26  1.31  1.30  1.20  0.04  −0.06  −0.11  −0.10 
 Oregon  1.17  1.35  1.46  1.22  0.29  0.06  −0.13  −0.24 
 Pennsylvania  1.01  0.90  0.90  0.92  −0.10  −0.08  0.02  0.02 
(continued)
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numbers of staff per 100 pupils. The state average (unweighted) increase was 
approximately 1 additional teacher per 100 pupils, moving from about 5.5 to about 
6.5 total teachers per 100 pupils. Most of those gains occurred prior to 2002. Over 
the past 10 years, state average staffi ng increases have been much more modest, 
and over the past 5 years, nonexistent.
 Table  4.6 displays state-by-state ratios of teachers per 100 pupils and changes in 
those ratios. States including Alabama and Virginia appear to have reduced teachers 
per 100 pupils by over 1.0 (or around 13–16 %). About half of states continued to 
increase numbers of teaching staff per 100 pupils. Notably, these fi gures change 
over time both as a function of changing numbers of staff and of changing numbers 
of pupils. States with constant staffi ng but declining enrollments will show 
 increasing staffi ng ratios. States with increasing enrollment but no additional staff 
will show decreasing staffi ng ratios.
Table 4.2 (continued)
 Fairness ratio current operating 
expenditures per pupil  Change over time 









 Rhode Island  0.93  1.08  1.11  1.03  0.18  0.10  −0.05  −0.08 
 South Carolina  1.04  1.28  1.20  1.26  0.16  0.22  −0.01  0.07 
 South Dakota  1.27  1.50  1.50  1.61  0.23  0.35  0.11  0.12 
 Tennessee  1.23  1.15  1.21  1.22  −0.02  −0.01  0.07  0.01 
 Texas  1.13  1.16  1.21  1.19  0.08  0.06  0.03  −0.02 
 Utah  1.89  1.68  1.78  1.49  −0.11  −0.40  −0.19  −0.29 
 Vermont  0.90  0.92  1.00  0.86  0.09  −0.04  −0.06  −0.13 
 Virginia  1.13  1.08  1.07  1.07  −0.06  −0.06  −0.01  0.00 
 Washington  1.30  1.28  1.29  1.21  −0.01  −0.10  −0.08  −0.09 
 West Virginia  1.06  1.16  1.14  1.19  0.08  0.13  0.03  0.06 
 Wisconsin  1.10  1.19  1.21  1.23  0.11  0.13  0.04  0.03 
 Wyoming  1.37  1.57  1.35  1.04  −0.02  −0.33  −0.52  −0.31 
 Table 4.3  Summary of changes in wage competitiveness 
 Period 
 # States that increased 
wage competitiveness  State mean change (%) 
 2000–2012  1  −12 
 2000–2007  3  −9 
 2007–2012  1  −8 
B. Baker et al.
121
 Table 4.4  Teacher/nonteacher wage ratios for select years 
 Wage competitiveness ratio 
(Teacher/Nonteacher) (%)  Change over time (%) 







 Alabama  83  83  77  71  −12  −12  −6 
 Alaska  89  104  118  85  −4  −19  −33 
 Arizona  79  74  70  62  −18  −13  −9 
 Arkansas  82  84  82  74  −7  −10  −8 
 California  79  82  82  75  −5  −7  −7 
 Colorado  81  75  70  68  −13  −6  −2 
 Connecticut  78  82  76  71  −7  −11  −5 
 Delaware  82  87  83  75  −7  −13  −9 
 District of 
Columbia 
 74  85  74  68  −7  −18  −6 
 Florida  85  82  80  73  −11  −8  −6 
 Georgia  76  76  74  68  −8  −8  −5 
 Hawaii  95  83  81  77  −17  −6  −4 
 Idaho  93  92  86  72  −21  −20  −13 
 Illinois  77  78  79  73  −4  −5  −6 
 Indiana  87  85  80  70  −17  −15  −10 
 Iowa  86  87  83  85  −1  −2  3 
 Kansas  87  80  77  70  −17  −10  −7 
 Kentucky  84  80  78  71  −13  −9  −7 
 Louisiana  78  78  79  75  −4  −3  −5 
 Maine  90  79  90  81  −9  2  −9 
 Maryland  80  77  78  75  −4  −2  −3 
 Massachusetts  77  72  77  69  −8  −3  −8 
 Michigan  93  88  94  78  −15  −10  −16 
 Minnesota  84  80  75  71  −13  −10  −5 
 Mississippi  86  81  78  72  −13  −9  −6 
 Missouri  83  76  78  68  −16  −9  −11 
 Montana  100  98  93  74  −26  −24  −19 
 Nebraska  86  82  78  77  −10  −6  −2 
 Nevada  93  85  84  82  −11  −3  −3 
 New Hampshire  78  82  75  73  −5  −9  −2 
 New Jersey  86  81  82  76  −10  −5  −6 
 New Mexico  77  82  85  78  1  −4  −7 
 New York  83  80  82  81  −2  1  −1 
 North Carolina  80  79  75  67  −13  −12  −8 
 North Dakota  87  86  77  70  −17  −17  −7 
 Ohio  80  79  82  75  −5  −4  −7 
 Oklahoma  80  78  76  67  −13  −11  −9 
 Oregon  93  82  86  75  −17  −7  −11 
(continued)
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 Relationships Across Adequacy (Level) Measures 
 Here we explore the relationships among these indicators. Figure  4.5 conveys that 
states with higher per pupil spending tend to have more teachers per 100 pupils on 
average. This suggests that, on balance and across states, higher spending on schools 
is leveraged to increase staffi ng quantities. The next question is the extent to which 
these increased overall staffi ng quantities translate to decreased class sizes, where 
research literature tends to point to more positive effects on student outcomes.
 Figure  4.6 shows that these differences in overall staffi ng ratios do translate to 
smaller class sizes, both for self-contained elementary classes and for secondary 
departmentalized settings. That is, while some may contest the direct relevance of 
pupil-to-teacher ratios as having infl uence on schooling quality, the availability of 
more staff certainly provides the opportunity for, and eventual reality of, smaller 
classes.
Table 4.4 (continued)
 Wage competitiveness ratio 
(Teacher/Nonteacher) (%)  Change over time (%) 







 Pennsylvania  94  92  85  80  −13  −12  −5 
 Rhode Island  92  87  94  78  −13  −8  −16 
 South Carolina  86  89  77  73  −13  −16  −4 
 South Dakota  82  88  78  68  −15  −21  −10 
 Tennessee  86  74  76  66  −20  −9  −10 
 Texas  77  78  73  69  −8  −9  −4 
 Utah  99  93  79  71  −28  −22  −8 
 Vermont  90  91  95  75  −15  −16  −20 
 Virginia  76  75  72  63  −14  −12  −10 
 Washington  79  78  74  69  −11  −9  −5 
 West Virginia  89  79  79  77  −12  −3  −2 
 Wisconsin  94  88  84  76  −18  −12  −8 
 Wyoming  106  91  99  94  −12  3  −5 
 Table 4.5  Summary of staffi ng level changes over time 
 Period 
 # States that improved 
staffi ng ratios  State average change 
 1993–2012  49  1.06 
 2002–2012  34  0.21 
 2007–2012  25  0.03 
 1993–2007  48  1.03 
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 Table 4.6  Predicted staffi ng ratios for select years 
 Teachers per 100 pupils  Change over time 









 Alabama  5.58  6.41  7.76  6.68  2.18  1.09  0.27  −1.09 
 Alaska  5.60  5.76  5.77  6.06  0.18  0.46  0.30  0.29 
 Arizona  4.99  5.26  5.43  5.50  0.44  0.51  0.24  0.07 
 Arkansas  5.57  6.66  6.55  6.56  0.98  0.99  −0.10  0.01 
 California  4.03  4.89  4.85  4.40  0.83  0.37  −0.50  −0.46 
 Colorado  5.12  5.89  5.93  5.67  0.81  0.55  −0.22  −0.26 
 Connecticut  6.71  7.37  6.92  8.02  0.21  1.31  0.65  1.10 
 Delaware  5.77  6.54  6.60  6.95  0.83  1.18  0.41  0.35 
 District of Columbia  5.57  7.78  7.74  8.46  2.17  2.90  0.68  0.72 
 Florida  5.59  5.49  6.25  7.01  0.66  1.42  1.52  0.77 
 Georgia  5.30  6.48  7.16  6.79  1.87  1.49  0.31  −0.38 
 Hawaii  4.90  6.08  6.42  6.57  1.52  1.67  0.49  0.15 
 Idaho  4.81  5.34  5.39  5.54  0.58  0.73  0.20  0.15 
 Illinois  5.42  6.14  5.84  6.39  0.43  0.98  0.25  0.55 
 Indiana  5.33  5.83  5.62  5.85  0.29  0.52  0.02  0.23 
 Iowa  5.66  6.71  6.92  6.66  1.27  1.00  −0.05  −0.27 
 Kansas  6.06  6.68  6.89  7.39  0.84  1.33  0.70  0.49 
 Kentucky  5.45  6.00  6.50  6.17  1.05  0.72  0.17  −0.33 
 Louisiana  5.81  7.04  7.21  7.10  1.40  1.29  0.06  −0.11 
 Maine  6.49  7.43  8.04  7.64  1.55  1.15  0.21  −0.40 
 Maryland  5.90  6.45  7.22  7.13  1.32  1.24  0.68  −0.08 
 Massachusetts  6.28  8.24  7.61  7.35  1.33  1.07  −0.90  −0.26 
 Michigan  4.86  5.54  5.56  5.36  0.69  0.50  −0.17  −0.19 
 Minnesota  5.38  6.20  6.08  6.09  0.70  0.71  −0.12  0.01 
 Mississippi  5.24  6.10  6.56  6.56  1.32  1.32  0.45  0.00 
 Missouri  5.44  6.62  6.77  6.84  1.33  1.40  0.23  0.07 
 Montana  4.91  5.63  5.86  5.98  0.95  1.07  0.35  0.12 
 Nebraska  5.91  6.65  6.88  6.94  0.97  1.04  0.30  0.07 
 Nevada  5.47  5.90  5.87  5.81  0.40  0.34  −0.08  −0.05 
 New Hampshire  5.96  6.84  7.48  7.29  1.52  1.33  0.45  −0.19 
 New Jersey  7.04  7.78  8.26  8.22  1.22  1.19  0.44  −0.04 
 New Mexico  5.24  6.66  6.68  6.45  1.44  1.21  −0.22  −0.23 
 New York  6.52  7.45  7.97  8.10  1.45  1.58  0.65  0.12 
 North Carolina  5.72  6.56  7.45  6.60  1.73  0.88  0.04  −0.85 
 North Dakota  5.17  6.26  6.99  7.40  1.82  2.22  1.14  0.41 
 Ohio  5.41  6.38  5.67  5.76  0.26  0.35  −0.62  0.09 
 Oklahoma  5.53  6.06  6.05  5.84  0.52  0.31  −0.22  −0.21 
 Oregon  4.90  4.96  4.18  4.72  −0.71  −0.18  −0.24  0.54 
 Pennsylvania  5.43  6.25  6.59  7.10  1.16  1.67  0.86  0.51 
(continued)
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Table 4.6 (continued)
 Teachers per 100 pupils  Change over time 









 Rhode Island  6.96  7.23  7.70  8.57  0.74  1.62  1.34  0.87 
 South Carolina  5.56  6.68  7.02  6.50  1.46  0.93  −0.18  −0.53 
 South Dakota  5.52  6.30  6.52  6.45  1.00  0.93  0.15  −0.07 
 Tennessee  4.80  6.45  6.47  6.75  1.67  1.96  0.30  0.29 
 Texas  5.75  6.91  6.95  6.73  1.19  0.98  −0.18  −0.22 
 Utah  4.17  4.67  4.61  4.38  0.44  0.21  −0.30  −0.23 
 Vermont  5.48  7.00  7.59  7.49  2.11  2.01  0.50  −0.10 
 Virginia  6.24  7.45  8.92  7.54  2.68  1.30  0.09  −1.38 
 Washington  5.56  5.20  5.30  5.13  −0.26  −0.43  −0.07  −0.17 
 West Virginia  6.19  6.79  5.70  7.08  −0.50  0.89  0.29  1.38 
 Wisconsin  5.73  6.79  6.70  6.58  0.97  0.85  −0.21  −0.12 

























Current Spending per Pupil (Constant 1999)
 Fig. 4.5  Spending levels and staffi ng levels 2011–2012 (Note: See Appendix (Table  4A.2 ) for full 
information by state) 
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 Figure  4.7 shows that variation across states in current spending levels also trans-
lates to variation in the competitiveness of teacher wages. We have already seen that 
states where spending is higher tend to have more teachers per pupil and smaller 
class sizes, consuming a share of the funds that might also be used for providing 
more competitive wages. 
 Figure  4.7 shows that states where school districts spend more also tend to have 
teacher wages more comparable to nonteachers at the same age and degree level. In 
other words, combining Figs.  4.5 through  4.7 , it would appear that much of the 
cross-state variation in school spending, which is driven by cross-state variation in 
fi scal effort, translates into real resource differences likely to matter—more com-
petitive wages, lower pupil-to-teacher ratios, and smaller classes.
 Figure  4.8 explores the within-state distribution of resources, asking whether 
there exists a relationship between current spending fairness across states’ school 
districts and staffi ng fairness. That is, if current spending per pupil is higher in 
higher poverty districts within a given state, are staffi ng concentrations also higher—
and vice versa? Do states that provide for fairer distribution of funding yield, on 
average, fairer distribution of staffi ng ratios? The answer to that question as seen in 
Fig.  4.8 is, setting aside outliers (North Dakota and Alaska), yes. See Appendix 
(Table  4A.2 ) for full information by state.
 Each of the above graphs and related correlations expresses only the relationship 
across states within the most recent year of data. These graphs do not speak to the 
question of whether increases or decreases in funding translate to increases or 
decreases in real resource levels or fairness. Unfortunately, our only real resource 
measure collected annually from 1993 to 2012 at the district level—thus useful for 














Teachers per  Pupils
Class Size - Departmental Class Size - Self Contained
 Fig. 4.6  Relating total staffi ng and class size (Note: See Appendix (Table  4A.2 ) for full informa-
tion by state) 
 



































Current Spending per Pupil
 Fig. 4.7  Spending levels and competitive wages (Note: See Appendix (Table  4A.2 ) for full infor-






























Current Spending per Pupil Fairness Ratio
 Fig. 4.8  Spending fairness and staffi ng fairness 2011–2012 (Note: See Appendix (Table  4A.2 ) for 
full information by state) 
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evaluating both predicted state levels and within-state variation over time—is our 
pupil-to-teacher ratio measure. 
 Table  4.7 shows the results of a 20-year fi xed effects model (also random effects) 
of the relationship between annual changes in spending levels and fairness, and 
pupil-to-teacher ratio fairness. The fi xed effects model evaluates year-over-year 
changes within states. That is, to what extent do within-state changes in spending 
result in within-state changes in pupil-to-teacher ratio distributions? The random 
effects model combines evaluation of within-state differences over time with across- 
state differences. Cross-state differences evaluate the extent that states with fairer 
(or less fair) distributions of spending have fairer (or less fair) distributions of pupil- 
to- teacher ratios. R-squared values display the extent of variance that is explained 
by the models  within states over time (averaged across states) and  between states at 
each point in time (averaged over time). The more substantial variations across 
states than within any state over time yield more predictable variation 
(r-squared = .694).
 In short, the model shows that when  spending fairness improves, so too do staff-
ing ratios in higher poverty districts. Each unit increase in  funding fairness (increase 
in relative spending of higher poverty districts compared to lower poverty districts) 
translates to an additional 0.4 units of staffi ng per 100 pupils. Put into more realistic 
terms, an increase in fairness ratio from 1.0 (fl at funding) to 1.25 (modestly progres-
sive funding) leads to an increase in 0.1 of a teacher per 100 pupils in high poverty, 
relative to low poverty districts. 
 These differences exist across states but also occur within states over time. The 
magnitude of the change over time effect is only slightly smaller than the combined 
change over time and cross sectional effect. In other words, whether across states at 
all time periods, or within states over time, the responsiveness of pupil-to-teacher 
ratio fairness to spending fairness is relatively consistent. 
 To summarize, if we target additional funding to higher poverty settings, that 
funding translates to increased numbers of teachers and a fairer statewide distribu-
tion of staffi ng ratios in those districts. Of course, the inverse also follows. 
 Table 4.7  Fixed effects model of pupil-to-teacher ratio fairness 
 Fixed effects  Random effects 
 N = 50×20 years  N = 50×20 years 
 DV = Teachers per 100 pupils fairness  Coef.  Std. err.  P > t  Coef.  Std. err.  P > t 
 Spending measures 
 Spending fairness  0.417  0.022  a  0.432  0.020  a 
 Constant  0.564  0.026  a  0.546  0.026  a 
 R-Squared 
 Within  0.278  0.278 
 Between  0.694  0.694 
 Overall  0.572  0.572 
 a p < .01 
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 Figures  4.9 and  4.10 explore within year, over time, relationships between 
within-state variation in current spending and within-state (within-labor market) 
variation in (a) class sizes and (b) teacher wages (conditioned on age, experience, 
teaching assignment, grade level). Both fi gures are based on within-year (within 
SASS wave) models. Figure  4.9 shows that within-year (except for 2007–2008) 








35% Fig. 4.9  Change in class 
size for 1 unit change in 
relative spending and 
relative poverty (Note: 
 Solid colored bars indicate 
statistically signifi cant 
class size differences) 
 Fig. 4.10  Change in salary competitiveness for 1 unit change in relative spending (Note:  Solid 
colored bars indicate statistically signifi cant salary differences) 
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ing differences across districts within metropolitan areas. For example, as we move 
from average to double the average current spending, in 2011–2012, departmental-
ized class sizes are reduced by over seven pupils. More realistically, as a district 
moves from average spending for its labor market to 20 % above average, class sizes 
are reduced by about 1.4 students (20 % of 7). Such reductions are suffi cient to be 
policy relevant. Recall that these estimates are conditioned on grade level taught and 
relative district poverty rate and include only nonrural schools.
 Figure  4.10 displays the relationship between the competitiveness of teacher 
salaries to other teachers with similar credentials in similar jobs on the same labor 
market. Teachers in districts in a given labor market where per-pupil spending is 
double the labor market average have 20 % higher wages than similar teachers in 
average spending districts on average in 2011–12. Taken together, Figs.  4.9 and  4.10 
support the conclusion that spending variation translates to meaningful real resource 
variation across children and across districts within the same labor market. These 
differences are signifi cant, and the resources in question are meaningful.
 Conclusions and Implications 
 The analyses presented validate the conclusion that variations in available revenues 
and expenditures are associated with variations in children’s access to real 
resources—as measured by the competitiveness of the wages paid to their teachers 
and by pupil-to-teacher ratios and class sizes. Put simply:
•  States that apply more effort—spending a greater share of their fi scal capacity on 
schools—generally spend more on schools. 
•  These higher spending levels translate into higher statewide staffi ng levels—
more certifi ed teaching staff per pupil. 
•  These higher staffi ng levels translate to smaller statewide class sizes. 
•  These higher spending levels translate to more competitive statewide teacher 
wages. 
•  Districts that have higher spending levels within states tend to provide smaller 
class sizes than surrounding districts with lower spending levels. 
•  Districts that have higher spending levels within states tend to provide more 
competitive teacher salaries than surrounding districts with lower spending 
levels. 
 These relationships hold (a) across states, (b) within states over time as resource 
levels change and (c) across districts within states and labor markets. The connec-
tions identifi ed here between school funding and real resource access speak to both 
equity and adequacy concerns. Equity and adequacy of fi nancial inputs to schooling 
across states are required if we ever expect to achieve more equitable access to a 
highly qualifi ed teacher workforce (as dictated in part by the competitiveness of 
their compensation) and reasonable class sizes. 
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 The loftier goal of equal educational opportunity—or equal opportunity across 
children to strive for common outcome goals—requires not merely equal real 
resources, but appropriately differentiated resources, including smaller classes and 
additional support services with at least equally qualifi ed teachers and other school 
staff. While the press is on to nationalize those outcome expectations through 
Common Core Standards and the assessments by which we measure them, our cur-
rent system for fi nancing schools is in full retreat from the equity and adequacy 
gains made between 1993 and 2007. 
 The recent  recession yielded an unprecedented decline in public school funding 
fairness. Thirty-six states had a 3-year average reduction in current spending fair-
ness between 2008–2009 and 2010–2011, and 32 states had a 3-year average reduc-
tion in state and local revenue fairness over that same time period. Even after the 
partial rebound of 2012, 30 states remained less fair in current spending than in 
2007. Nearly every state has experienced a long-term (10-year) decline in the com-
petitiveness of teacher wages. Between 2007 and 2012, 33 states saw increases in 
pupil-to-teacher ratios. 
 Notably, while equity overall took a hit between 2007 and 2012, the initial state 
of funding equity varied widely at the outset of the period, with Massachusetts and 
New Jersey being among the most progressively funded states in 2007. Thus, they 
arguably had further to fall. Funding equity for many states has barely budged over 
time and remained persistently regressive, for example, in Illinois, New York, and 
Pennsylvania. Potential infl uences on these patterns are also elusive and widely 
varied. In Missouri, we see the 1990s infl uence of desegregation orders, which capi-
talized on the state’s matching aid program to generate additional revenue in Kansas 
City and St. Louis driving spending progressiveness, but when the state adopted a 
need-weighted foundation aid formula in 2006, spending continued to become more 
regressive. 
 We see the more logical infl uence of school fi nance reforms in Massachusetts in 
the early 1990s and in New Jersey in the late 1990s after court orders targeting 
additional funds to needy districts, yielding an overall pattern of progressiveness. 
Court orders in New York state (2006) appears to have had little or no infl uence on 
equity, and the infl uence of court orders over time in Kansas have moved the needle 
only slightly. A better understanding of the role of judicial involvement requires 
signifi cant additional exploration of these data linked to information on both judi-
cial activity and legislative reforms. 
 Finally, the coming years will tell us both whether state school fi nance systems 
can rebound from the effects of the downturn or whether these effects have become 
permanent, and they will inform us about the consequences for short- and long-term 
student outcomes. A signifi cant body of literature has now shown the positive 
effects of equity and adequacy improvements of the prior 40-plus years of school 
fi nance reform. Similar methods applied years from now may reveal the deleterious 
infl uences of these dark ages of American public school fi nance. 
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 Appendix 
 Table 4A.1  Data sources, years, and measures 





 District level fi scal measures 




Survey (F-33) a 
 1993–2012 
 State revenue  District  F-33  1993–2012 
 Local revenue  District  F-33  1993–2012 
 Federal revenue  District  F-33  1993–2012 
 District characteristics 
 Enrollment  District  National Center 
for Education 
Statistics (NCES), 
Common Core of 
Data (CCD) b 
 1993–2012 
 Grade ranges  District  CCD  1993–2012 
 Pupil/teacher ratios  District  CCD  1993–2012 
 Regional cost variation 
 Education comparable wage 
index 
 District  Taylor’s Extended 
NCES Comparable 
Wage Index 
 1997–2012  1993–
1996, 2012 
 Population needs/characteristics 
 Child poverty c  District  U.S. Census Small 
Area Income and 
Poverty Estimates d 






 Teacher characteristics 





 Wages/compensation  Teacher linked to 
school/district 
(sample) 
 NCES Schools and 






 Class size  School (sample)  NCES Schools and 






 a U.S. Census . Public Elementary–Secondary Education Finance Data 
 b U.S. Department of Education , National Center for Education Statistics. Common Core of Data 
 c See Baker et al. ( 2013b ) 
 d U.S. Census . Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates, School District Data Files 
 e U.S. Department of Education , National Center for Education Statistics. Schools and Staffi ng 
Survey 
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